A feature that most Ethereum users had never touched ended up at the center of a multibillion-dollar exchange breach on October 29, 2026. Binance says attackers used its wallet signing service to set up EIP-7702 delegation on a hot wallet. The delegation kept draining assets after Binance paused withdrawals.
To check an EIP-7702 delegation, open the wallet address on a block explorer and look for code that starts with 0xef0100. To remove it, the wallet owner signs a new authorization that points to the zero address and submits it on the correct network.
This guide on EIP-7702 Delegation After Binance Hack explains how the Binance incident report describes the attack, what the delegation did, and how wallet owners can check and revoke one. It is written for both wallet owners and exchange security teams. Details are current as of Wednesday, November 18, 2026. Incident figures are as reported by Binance up to its November 3 update.
EIP-7702 lets a regular Ethereum wallet run smart contract code through a signed authorization. Binance says attackers used its compromised signing service to authorize a malicious contract on the Binance 14 wallet. That $EIP-7702 delegation stayed active until Binance cleared it at 00:10 UTC on October 30.
EIP-7702 is an Ethereum improvement that went live with the Pectra upgrade in May 2025. It lets a regular wallet, called an Externally Owned Account (EOA), borrow the code of a smart contract. This process is called $EIP-7702 delegation.
A user signs an authorization. It holds four parts: the chain ID, the contract address, a nonce, and a signature. The nonce is a counter that must match the account’s current transaction count, so each authorization works only once. A chain ID of zero lets the authorization apply on any network, as long as the nonce matches there. Several authorizations can travel together in an Ethereum authorization list.
Once the network accepts the authorization, the account stores a short marker. The marker starts with 0xef0100 and points to the contract. Whenever someone calls the wallet, that contract’s code runs. This is account abstraction, where wallets act like programmable accounts. It also raises new security questions.
Binance describes a multi-stage campaign. According to the company, attackers used fake job interviews, malware, and a compromised internal AI tool to reach engineer devices. They then used the signing service to start transactions outside the normal withdrawal process. These details are reported by Binance and are still under investigation.
| Time (UTC) | Event |
|---|---|
| Oct 29, 20:05 to 20:09 | Five hot wallets send 233.46 million XRP out. |
| Oct 29, near 20:20 | Delegation to a malicious contract goes live on Binance 14. |
| Oct 29, 23:56 | Final unauthorized transfer of 2,961.9 ETH finalizes. |
| Oct 30, 00:10 | Authorizes the zero address, clearing the delegation. |
Binance’s own report does not give an exact time for the delegation. Binance says the attackers submitted 50 signing transactions to change the wallet nonce and set up the malicious EIP-7702 delegation. Once it was active, attackers could call the wallet to trigger the sweeper contract. Later deposits therefore stayed exposed.
As of its November 3 update, it puts affected assets at about $6.34 billion. Roughly $2.85 billion was frozen or intercepted. These figures may change as the investigation continues.
Withdrawal controls sit inside Binance’s own systems. The EIP-7702 delegation lived on-chain, so it kept working independently of them.
Removing it needed a fresh authorization from the wallet itself. The wallet used multi-party computation (MPC). In MPC, several parties each hold a share of the signing power. No single private key could clear the delegation quickly, so Binance had to build a special procedure.
Binance’s account does not describe a consensus failure. In this Ethereum delegation attack, the feature worked as designed, and the failure was abused signing authority. The exact attack mechanics remain reported, not settled, while the investigation is ongoing.
Crypto wallet permission risks fall into several groups.
Academic work shows the scale. A study of EIP-7702 security risks found 924 malicious contract accounts across seven blockchains. It also linked over 63% of authorization transactions to attacks on regular wallets. [Source: INSERT study title, authors, USENIX deep link, and method summary] These are study-wide results, not Binance figures.
Find the 0xef0100 code on the wallet address, sign an authorization to the zero address, and submit it on the correct network. Then confirm on the explorer that the code is gone.
Safety limits: Wallet owners should never sign an unknown authorization request. Revocation does not reverse completed transfers or repair compromised signing systems. It also does not cancel ERC-20 token approvals, which need their own review. If the wallet interface or signing setup is already compromised, the revocation itself can fail. In that case, moving remaining assets to a clean wallet protected by a new private key is the safer first step.
| Feature | Traditional wallet | EIP-7702 Delegation |
|---|---|---|
| Execution | Single transactions | Delegated contract code |
| Gas fees | Paid by owner | A sponsor can pay |
| Main risk | Key theft | Key theft plus delegation code |
The risk also differs by wallet type. In a user wallet, one phished signature can create a harmful delegation. In an exchange MPC wallet, the risk sits with whoever can request signatures from the signing service.
Exchanges should run policy checks before any signing service approves an authorization.
Individual users should check their wallet address for 0xef0100 code from time to time. They should also review wallet permissions before signing anything new.
Account abstraction security now includes the question of who can request signatures. A protected private key means little if a server can still ask for signatures on demand. Persistent delegation makes this worse, because one approved authorization can outlive the compromise that created it. Independent wallet security guidance also urges teams to audit what their signing systems can approve.
Open questions remain. it says the investigation is ongoing, some technical details stay confidential, and independent reviews are planned. This article will be updated when company publishes new findings, recovery figures, or official disclosures.
EIP-7702 delegation adds useful features, including batching and gas sponsorship. But a malicious delegation can expose wallet funds, as the security incident showed. Checking permissions before signing and watching wallets for unexpected delegations remain the safest habits. Wallet owners who need to know how to revoke EIP-7702 delegation should follow the steps above and verify the result on an explorer.
Wallet owners should also follow news and Ethereum news for updates. An Ethereum security hub page can serve as a starting point for related guides.
This article is for information and is not financial or security advice. Crypto assets carry high risk, and details of the incident may change as investigations continue. Readers should research before acting.